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Abstract
In this paper we contend that – contrary to what argued by a vast
part of the literature – computer software and, more in general, digital
goods (i.e. symbolic strings on an electronic medium with some eco-
nomic value) do not present the characteristics of a public good as they
do not suffer from lack of rivarly and excludability any more than other
durable goods which are regularly allocated on competitive markets.
We argue instead that the “market allocation problem” – if any – with
digital goods does not arise from their public nature but from some pe-
culiar characteristics of the production technology. The latter presents
the nature of a typical problem solving activity as far as the produc-
tion of the first unit is concerned, this means that innovative activities
in computer software are characterized by high degrees of interdepen-
dencies, cumulativeness, sequentiality, path dependence and, more in
general, sub-optimality arising from imperfect problem decompositions.
As far as the production of further units is concerned, we observe in-
stead high (but not infinite) expansibility and perfect codification (lack
of any tacit dimension) which make diffusion costs rapidly fall.
Given such claims, we argue that a standard “Coasian” approach to
property rights, designed to cope with the externalities of semi-public
goods may not be appropriate for computer software, as it may decrease
both ex-ante incentives to innovation and ex-post efficiency of diffusion.
On the other hand the institutional definition of property rights may
strongly influence the patterns of technological evolution and division
of labor in directions which are not necessarily optimal.
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1 Introduction
Computer software is an archetypical example of a digital good (Quah 2003),
that is a good which is made of information encoded into strings of characters
(e.g. – in addition to computer programs – files encoding music, pictures
or movies, but also genetic codes), and is therefore usually considered as a
public or quasi-public good because of the non-rivarly of the information it
embodies. A good is non-rival in consumption if the same unit of that good
can be consumed by potentially infinite consumers without diminishing the
consumption level of any of them.
In the case of non-rival goods competitive markets cannot be relied upon
to yield price signals that lead to socially efficient outcomes with respect to
production and distribution. The marginal cost of information is zero but
if information is distributed at zero cost, as required in an efficient market,
producers will not have an adequate incentive to produce it.
The “property solution” to the information production problem amounts to
creating, assigning and enforcing private intellectual property rights. This has
as its most immediate consequence the creation of an artificial scarcity which
assures the appropriability of returns from investments (mainly in R&D) neces-
sary to produce the first unit. A monopoly right to the commercial exploitation
of an idea is offered in return for its disclosure. This institutional device al-
lows the organization of market exchanges of transferable exploitation rights
which, by assigning value to commercially exploitable ideas, create economic
incentives for people and firms to creating new ones.
That “property” can be or actually is applied both as an incentive mech-
anism or as a device to assure the appropriability of returns is however ques-
tioned by a number of empirical and theoretical studies. On the other hand,
the recent and increasingly straightforward adoption of “property” in the do-
main of information and knowledge has raised a number of doubts as to its
effectiveness as a means to promote their creation and diffusion.
According to this perspective, in our paper we will try and examine two
main issues related to IP protection when meant to be an application of the
property rights paradigm to the domain of digital goods in general and com-
puter software in particular.
First we will question the assumption that digital goods are really non-rival
and argue that the degree of non-rivarly of digital goods stands quite far from
the one of pure public goods and close – on the contrary – to the one we can
find in many private goods. The peculiarity of digital goods does not reside so
much in their non-rivarly but rather in the low cost of production of the units
after the first, i.e. in its quasi “infinite expansibility” David (1992).
Second, if the “problem” is in the production technology and not in the
good itself, we should examine more closely the conditions of production. In
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this paper we suggest that the production of computer software can be usefully
framed in terms of problem solving. Problem solving activities present some
important features, namely non-monotonic interdependencies and cumulative-
ness. In this paper we sketch a model of problem-solving technology which
allows us to point out the potential inefficiency of property rights fragmenta-
tion.
2 (Non-)rivarly of digital goods
A pure public good, e.g. public security, is non-rival because my consumption
of the good is compatible with the joint consumption of the same good of
many (virtually infinitely many) other consumers. Note however that rivarly
is a matter of degree: only goods which get destroyed with consumption are
fully rival. I can share with other people the services provided by my car, my
HiFi equipment and my TV set up to a given capacity. Interestingly enough
the legislator does not seem to worry about inhibiting such manifestations of
non-rivarly as car pooling or inviting friends at one’s place to watch a soccer
match on TV. Moreover the “up to a given capacity” clause applies also to pure
public goods: non-rivarly does not imply zero marginal costs for all quantity
intervals.
Note that in pure public goods a high degree of non-rivarly is matched by
non misurability, and actually this seems the crucial factor for market failure.
It is very hard if not impossible to define and measure a unit of consumption for
these goods and therefore it is very hard or impossible to make consumers pay
proportionally to the quantity consumed. We could for instance define “one
hour without being victim of a crime” as the standard unit of consumption of
public security but information, measuring and, in general, transaction costs
would be enormous. Moreover my enjoyment of some units of “one hour with-
out being victim of a crime” is only loosely related to the production of public
security, because public goods are typically “environmental” goods (very high
cross-externalities with various economic and non-economic activities): people
living in Aosta enjoy, on average, more “hours without being victim of a crime”
than people living in some outskirts of Naples, though the effort exerted by
the producer of public security is considerably higher in the latter location.
Now, digital goods are neither non-measurable (at least to an extent greater
than the one of all durable goods for which we pay a general and unspecified
right to consume their services) nor environmental (though they might in some
cases have considerable network externalities) and seem therefore to be com-
pletely missing some very important defining features of public goods.
What is really peculiar of digital goods is that the marginal costs of du-
plication are very low (but non zero) and the technology for duplication is
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accessible to nearly everybody, while the costs of producing the first unit are
considerable.
3 Problem-solving, interdependencies and the
dangers of rights’ fragmentation
As well documented in a wide array of empirical studies, in the past two
decades the domain of (technological) knowledge has been so finely divided
by property claims – on essentially complementary pieces of information –
that the cost of reassembling constituent rights in order to engage in further
research seems to be charging a heavy burden on technological advance. In
the realm of scientific and technological research, this has taken the form of a
spiral of overlapping patent claims in the hands of different owners reaching
ever further upstream.
In our opinion, the attitude towards fragmentation is much in line with a
Coasian effort to create as many rights as there are markets. Actually, the co-
extensiveness of markets and property rights is hailed by economic wisdom as
the setting in which competition can promote efficiency at its best: no transac-
tion costs coupled with well defined and perfectly exchangeable property rights
lead to perfect allocative efficiency.
Ideally, in a perfectly Coasian world a market would exist for every right
with an economic value (Coase 1960). This presupposes individual property
rights to be perfectly (and costlessly) defined, perfectly (and costlessly) en-
forced and perfectly (and costlessly) exchangeable. In this way every ineffi-
cient allocation would be avoided. In turn, the whole argument presupposes
the very possibility of a limitless separability of property rights and of an ever
finer definition thereof.
National authorities, both in the US and the EU, have adopted an attitude
towards patenting that clearly reflects these principles. As a matter of fact,
IP rights are being granted on increasingly fragmented “chunks” of knowledge
such as single genes, databases, algorithms or parts thereof.
As suggested by Coase himself, the finest possible property rights structure
is very likely to induce less rather than more competition as underlying markets
will be so thin, with respect to the number of agents involved, as to induce
monopolistic behaviors and considerable transaction costs. It thus seems that,
in the end, allocative inefficiencies might arise which are not less serious than
those which a strong and fine-grained rights structure was meant to eliminate.
A fast growing literature, both in the economic and legal discipline, is cur-
rently debating and questioning the idea that “more property rights imply
more efficiency” and the idea that “commons, however defined and practiced
are tragic”. Under this respect, we will suggest that the problem-solving na-
4
ture of the innovative process in computer software implies that more prop-
erty rights do not necessarily imply more innovation and that moreover the
institutional arrangements of rights do not only impinge upon the speed of in-
novation but also upon its direction. More finely defined intellectual property
rights may cause sub-optimal technological trajectories. More in general we
submit that the efficiency and sustainability of resources management systems
crucially depends on technological characteristics of resources themselves and
on contractual and institutional patterns of their usage in precise historical
moments.
There can be little contention that the production of new software presents
the typical characteristics of problem-solving activities. Notably, it is a process
of designing viable solutions in a huge combinatorial problem space, charac-
terized by very diffused interdependencies.
As pointed out by (Simon 1969), problem-solving by boundedly rational
agents must necessarily proceed by decomposing any large, complex and in-
tractable problem into smaller sub-problems that can be solved independently,
by promoting what could be called the division of problem-solving labor. At
the same time, note that the extent of the division of problem-solving labor is
limited by the existence of interdependencies. If sub-problem decomposition
separates interdependent elements, then solving each sub-problem indepen-
dently does not allow overall optimization.
As a consequence, in the presence of strong interdependencies, one cannot
optimize a system by separately optimizing each element it is made of. Con-
sider a problem that is made up of N elements and whose optimal solution is
x∗1x
∗
2 . . . x
∗
N while the current state is x1x2 . . . xN . In the presence of strong
interdependencies, it might well be the case that some or even all the solutions
of the x1x2 . . . x
∗
i . . . xN kind show a worse performance than the current one.
1
It is important to remark that the introduction of any decentralized inter-
action mechanism, such as a competitive market for each component does not
solve the problem. For instance, if we assume that in our previous example
each component xi is traded in a competitive market, superior components x
∗
i
will never be selected. Thus, interdependencies undermine the effectiveness of
the selection process as a device for adaptive optimization and they introduce
forms of path-dependency with lock-in into sub-optimal states that do not
originate from the frictions and costs connected to the selection mechanism,
but from the internal complexity of the entities undergoing selection.
As (Simon 1969) pointed out, an optimal decomposition (i.e. a decompo-
sition that divides into separate sub-problems all and only the elements that
are independent from each other) can only be designed by someone who has
1Note that this notion of interdependency differs from the notion of complementarity as
sub-modularity as in (Milgrom & Roberts 1990). Here, in fact, we allow for the possibility
that positive variations in one component can decrease the system’s performance value.
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a perfect knowledge of the problem (including its optimal solution). On the
contrary, boundedly rational agents will normally be forced to design near-
decompositions, that is decompositions that try to put together, within the
same sub-problem, only those components whose interdependencies are (or,
we shall add, agents believe to be) more important for the overall system
performance. However, near-decompositions involve a fundamental trade-off:
on the one hand, finer decompositions exploit the advantages of decentralized
local adaptation, that is, the use of a selection mechanism for achieving coor-
dination “for free” together with parallelism and adaptation speed. However,
on the other hand, finer decompositions imply a higher probability that inter-
dependent components are separated into different sub-problems and therefore
cannot, in general, be optimally adjusted together. In this paper we provide a
precise measure of this trade-off and show that, in the presence of widespread
interdependencies, finer than optimal decompositions have an evolutionary
advantage (in terms of adaptation speed), although they inevitably involve
lock-in into sub-optimal solutions.
One way of expressing the limits that interdependencies pose to the divi-
sion of problem-solving labor is that global performance signals are not able
to effectively drive decentralized search in the problem space. Local moves in
the “right direction” might well decrease the overall performance if some other
elements are not properly tuned. As Simon puts it, since an entity (e.g. an or-
ganism in biology or an organization in economics) only receives feedback from
the environment concerning the fitness of the whole entity, only under condi-
tions of near independence can the usual selection processes work successfully
for complex systems (Simon 2002, p. 593).
A further aspect concerns the property that, in general, the search space
of a problem is not given exogenously, but is constructed by individuals and
organizations as a subjective representation of the problem itself and through
the very process of problem-solving which defines a focal framework for future
representations. If the division of problem-solving labor is limited by inter-
dependencies, the structure of interdependencies itself depends on how the
problem is framed by problem-solvers. Sometimes problem-solvers make ma-
jor leaps forward by reframing the same problem in a novel way. As shown by
many case studies, major innovations often appear when various elements that
were well-known are recombined and put together under a different perspec-
tive. Indeed, one can go as far as to say that it is the representation of a prob-
lem that determines its purported difficulty2 and that one of the fundamental
functions of organizations is precisely to implement collective representations
of the problems they face.
2(Simon 1969) argues that “Solving a problem simply means representing it so as to make
the solution transparent”.
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In the following we present a formal model, drawn from (Marengo, Pasquali
& Valente 2005) and (Marengo & Dosi 2005). The key issue and difficulty ad-
dressed by the model is the opacity of single entities’ functional relations and
the partial understanding of their context-dependent individual contributions
in forming a solution to the problem at hand. The model accounts for the
relationships between problem complexity, task decentralization and “problem
solving” efficiency. The main findings show that in domains of highly interde-
pendent entities, such as complementary patents, there are delicate trade-offs
between the exploitation of the advantages of decentralization and the need to
control for complex interdependencies and that optimal dynamic search path
usually are not generated by highly fragmented structures. At the same time
a precise set of tools are introduced to compare the efficiency properties of
different institutional arrangements with respect to their different degrees of
fragmentation and enforceability of property rights.
4 The model’s general structure
The idea behind this model is to have a very general set of minimal ele-
ments with which we can easily build and analyze, mainly computationally but
partly also analytically, collective problem solving under different institutional
regimes. The model is strictly agent-based, in the sense that the elementary
building block is a problem-solving agent and all aggregate properties are the
result of the interaction among heterogeneous agents. The rules of interaction
define the institutional structure, among which property rules play a central
role.
The model has three components: environment, agents and institutional
structure.
The environment is the problem space, where some entities (objects, solu-
tions, artifacts, etc.) are evaluated against an exogenously given value (“fit-
ness”) function. The environment is largely unknown to agents and as we
will see it plays only the role of providing a payoff feed-back for the learning
process.
Individual problem-solving agents have an imperfect knowledge of the en-
vironment and are heterogeneous, in the sense that they may differ from each-
other in terms of problem knowledge, problem-solving ability and objectives
(evaluation of different solutions).
Agents adaptively search for better solutions in a problem environment
they do not know, but search is directed by their cognitive representation of
the environment.
In particular, agents are characterized by the following elements:
1. an encoding of the possible solutions and their relevant features in some
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(binary) alphabet. Such encoding can be complete (one-to-one) or, most
commonly, incomplete (many-to-one) meaning that different objects are
encoded as equivalent (typically because some relevant features are ne-
glected) and therefore cannot be distinguished;
2. a decomposition of the problem-space, i.e. a conjecture of the interde-
pendencies among features, which act as a template for the generation
of new tentative solutions;
3. a subjective evaluation function, which may coincide with or differ from
the “true” value function of the environment and/or may coincide with
or differ from the evaluation function of other agents.
Given such three elements, an agent searches for better solutions in an
adaptive fashion: given the current solution it looks for better one by modifying
some of the blocks defined by its decomposition. The new solution is accepted
if it increases the value of the agent’s evaluation function.
In general this search process ends in a local optimum of the evaluation
function, as common in NK type models (Kauffman 1993). The number, po-
sitions and values of such local optima depend on all the above mentioned
elements: encoding, decomposition and evaluation.
We can precisely compute such local optima, with their basins of attraction
and the expected time (number of steps) taken to reach one of them from any
initial condition. Therefore we can also easily construct indexes of the agent’s
ability in any given problem environment.
Finally, by institutional structure we mean the set of “rules of the game”
through which agents interact. In particular we will concentrate on property
rules and on two aspects thereof:
1. is property defined upon the results of individual search for solutions
or can solutions be freely used and improved upon? In the former case
property can take the form of veto and/or royalty fees on solutions which
are somehow similar to a proprietary one.
2. at which level of granularity are rights defined? over entire solutions or
on separate modules thereof? and how “large” are these modules?
In what follows we spell out the details of the model and present some very
preliminary results. A fully fledged exploration of a full range of institutional
structures is under way.
5 The basic component: a problem-solving agent
We assume that solving a given problem requires the coordination of N atomic
“elements” or “actions” or “pieces of knowledge”, which we generically call
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components, each of which can assume some (finite) number of alternative
states. For the sake of simplicity, in what follows we assume that each com-
ponent can assume only two alternative states, labelled 0 and 1. Note that
all the properties presented below for the two-states case can very easily be
extended to any finite number of states.
More precisely, we characterize a problem by the following elements:
A finite set of objects, or possible solutions: O = {o1, o2, . . . ow}
An ordering over the set of objects: we write oi  oj (or oi  oj) whenever
oi is weakly (or strictly) preferred to oj.
A problem is defined by the pair (O,).
Problem-solving agents do not have a direct knowledge of the problem itself,
but hold and use a representation thereof. Such a representation consists of
an encoding of the objects and a decomposition of the encoded problem space.
An encoding of the set of objects is a mapping from the set O to a set of
internal states: Ω : O 7→ X where X is the set of words of an alphabet which
we assume binary for simplicity: C = {c1, c2, . . . cN} with ci ∈ {0, 1}. All in
all, X = {x1, x2, . . . , x2N} is the set of encoded objects.
A representation is complete if the mapping Ω is one-to-one and therefore
O has the same cardinality as X, is incomplete if it is many-to-one. In most
relevant situations the sheer cardinality of the problem’s search space makes
complete representations unattainable by human beings. Individual problem-
solvers are bound to use heuristics which vastly reduce the size of the search
space: for instance in a Rubik cube players look only at one side of the cube,
treating as identical all states for which that side’s configuration is the same.
Thus, while maintaining that assuming complete representations is unrealistic,
we will anyway begin our analysis from there, in order to obtain some bench-
mark results against which we can then compare those derived from the more
realistic assumption of incomplete representations.
Even when holding complete representations, and therefore conceiving the
entire search space, the combinatorial nature of this space makes it much
too vast to be extensively searched by agents with bounded computational
capabilities. One way of reducing its size is to decompose3 it into sub-spaces.
Let I = {1, 2, . . . , N} be the set of indexes and let a block4 di ⊆ I be a
non-empty subset of it, we call the size of block di , its cardinality |di|. We
define a decomposition scheme (or simply decomposition) of the problem
3A decomposition can be considered as a particular case of search heuristics: search
heuristics are, in fact, ways of reducing the number of configurations to be considered in a
search process.
4Blocks in our model can be considered as a formalization of the notion of modules used by
the flourishing literature on modularity in technologies and organizations (Baldwin & Clark
2000) and decomposition schemes are a formalization of the notion of system architecture
which defines the set of modules in which a technological system or an organization are
decomposed.
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(X,) a set of blocks:
D = {d1, d2, . . . , dk}
such that
k⋃
i=1
di = I
Note that a decomposition does not necessarily have to be a partition.
Given a configuration xi and a block dj, we call block-configuration x
i(dj)
the substring of length |dj| containing the components of configuration xi be-
longing to block dj:
xi(dj) = x
i
j1
xij2 . . . x
i
j|dj |
for all jh ∈ dj.
We also use the notation xi(d−j) to indicate the substring of length N−|dj|
containing the components of configuration xi not belonging to block dj.
Two block-configurations can be united into a larger block-configuration by
means of the ∨ operator so defined:
x(dj) ∨ y(dh) = z(dj ∪ dh) where zν =
{
xν if ν ∈ dj
yν otherwise
We can therefore write xi = xi(dj) ∨ xi(d−j) for any dj.
Moreover, we define the size of a decomposition scheme as the size of
its largest defining block:
|D| = max {|d1|, |d2|, . . . |dk|}
We assume that agents use their decomposition as a sort of template for
generating new solutions, through the following trial-and-error process: a block
of the decomposition is randomly chosen, a new sub-configuration for this block
is (randomly) generated by mutating at leat one and up to all elements of this
block but holding the rest of the configuration (outside the considered block)
unchanged. If the newly generated configuration is preferred to the former
then it is kept, otherwise it is discarded.
More precisely, let us assume that the current configuration is xi and take
block dh with its current block-configuration x
i(dh). Let us now consider a
new configuration xj(dh) for the same block, if:
xj(dh) ∨ xi(d−h)  xi(dh) ∨ xi(d−h)
then xj(dh) is selected and the new configuration x
j(dh) ∨ xi(d−h) is kept in
place of xi, otherwise xj(dh) is discarded and x
i is kept.
6 Individual problem-solving with complete rep-
resentations
Given an encoding Ω : O 7→ X and a decomposition schemeD = {d1, d2, . . . , dk},
we say that a configuration xi is a preferred neighbor or simply a neighbor of
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configuration xj with respect to a block dh ∈ D if the following three conditions
hold:
1. xi  xj
2. xiν = x
j
ν ∀ν /∈ dh
3. xi 6= xj
Conditions 2 and 3 require that the two configurations differ only by com-
ponents which belong to block dh. According to the definition, a neighbor
can be reached from a given configuration through the trial-and-error process
described above.
We call Hi(x, di) the set of neighbors of a configuration x for block di.
The set of best neighbors Bi(x, di) ⊆ Hi(x, di) of a configuration x for
block di is the set of the most preferred configurations in the set of neighbors:
Bi(x, di) = {y ∈ Hi(x, di) such that y  z ∀z ∈ Hi(x, di)}
By extension from single blocks to entire decomposition schemes, we can
give the following definition of the set of neighbors for a decomposition scheme
as:
H(x,D) =
k⋃
i=1
Hi(x, di)
A configuration is a local optimum for the decomposition scheme D if
there does not exist a configuration y such that y ∈ H(x,D).
Given an encoding Ω : O 7→ X and a decomposition schemeD = {d1, d2, . . . , dk}
which characterize and agent’s representation, its set of local optima is fully
determined. We call Λi(Ωi, Di) agent i’s set of local optima.
A first question which arises is the size of such a set Λi. If we assume for
simplicity that the “real” problem has only one globally optimum solution o0,
we ask under which condition its encoding x(o0) is also the only element in
Λi. The following three statements (rather trivial to prove
5) provide the basic
results on the roles of encodings and decompositions:
1. for any complete encoding Ω the degenerate decomposition (i.e. no de-
composition at all) D = {1, 2, . . . , N} guarantees that Λ = x(o0), i.e.
that the global optimum is also a unique local optimum;
2. for any problem there exist encodings for which D = {1, 2, . . . , N} is also
the only decomposition having such a property;
5For a more precise formal argument, proofs and extensions, see (Marengo & Dosi 2005).
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3. for any problem there exist a complete encoding such that also the finest
decomposition D = {{1}, {2}, . . . , {N}} (and, on that respect, any other
decomposition) guarantees that Λ = x(o0), i.e. that the global optimum
is also a unique local optimum;
Taken together these three propositions have the following implications.
First, in a sense the encoding is much more powerful than the decomposi-
tion in determining the difficulty of a problem: by appropriately acting on
the encoding any finite problem can be made optimally solvable by any de-
composition including the finest one. Note that if the finest decomposition is
used that optimal solution is found in linear time with the simplest possible
blind trial-and-error algorithm which changes one dimension at a time without
caring for possible interdependencies. Second, if the encoding is not optimal
in this sense, then it is possible that only the degenerate decomposition al-
lows to locate with certainty the global optimum, while finer decompositions
make the set Λ of local optima grow larger and larger. Note however that the
degenerate decomposition, i.e. not decomposing the problem at all, is a very
inefficient and time consuming search algorithm as it requires a search time
exponential in N. In general finer decompositions will lead the search process
to suboptimal solutions but do so relatively quickly and therefore may display
higher efficiency with respect to coarser decompositions which certainly locate
better solutions but more slowly: there is a trade-off between optimality of the
outcome and speed of search (Marengo & Dosi 2005).
7 Institutional analysis
In the previous section we have built a model of individual problem-solving
which suggests that only under special conditions will individual agents solve
the problem optimally and efficiently (i.e. minimizing time and cost of search).
Now we ask whether a collection of heterogenous agents, that is characterized
by diverse encodings and decompositions, can perform better, worse or equally
than individual agents. We will perform this analysis by making precise hy-
pothesis on the restrictions which property rules can put upon the use and
sharing of solutions found by individual agents. In particular we will focus
upon two issues, namely:
1. is the use of a current solution vetoed or limited for activities of “im-
proving around” in order to find more valuable solutions?
2. are such restrictions – if they exist – defined only on entire solutions or
also on smaller modules? (rights fragmentation)
We begin by analyzing the latter question.
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7.1 Rights’ fragmentation
Our model of problem-solving adumbrates delicate trade-offs between decom-
posability, complexity reduction and search speed on the one hand and asymp-
totic optimality on the other.
Let us consider the trade-off between speed of search and optimality. For
instance, Figure 1 shows that in Kauffman’s NK random landscapes6 there
exist only decomposition schemes of size N or just below N even for very small
values of K (that is, for highly correlated landscapes). In other words, a little
bit of interdependence spread across the set of components immediately makes
a system practically indecomposable.
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Figure 1: Size of minimum decomposition schemes for random NK problems.
(N=12)
We can soften the perfect decomposability requirement into one of near-
decomposability; we no longer require the problem to be decomposed into
completely separated sub-problems (i.e. sub-problems that fully contain all
interdependencies) but we might be content to find sub-problems that contain
6An NK random fitness landscape is similar to our definition of “problem” except that,
instead of a preference relation, a real valued fitness function F : X 7→ R is defined as an
average of each component’s fitness contribution. The latter is a random realization of a
random variable uniformly distributed over the interval [0, 1] for each possible configuration
of the K-size block of the other components with which each component interacts (Kauffman
1993). Note, however, that Kauffman’sK is not a good ex-post complexity measure (in terms
of its decomposability) of the optimization problem on the resulting fitness landscape; small
values of K usually generate landscapes that are not decomposable, but on the other hand,
it is always possible that, even with very high values of K, the resulting landscape is highly
decomposable.
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the most “relevant” interdependencies, while less relevant ones can persist
across sub-problems. In this way, optimizing each sub-problem independently
will not necessarily lead to the global optimum, but to a “good” solution.
Figure 2 shows, for randomly generated problems,7 that if second-best so-
lutions are accepted we can reduce considerably the size of the decomposition
schemes and thus the expected search time: every reduction of 1 unit of the size
of the decomposition scheme halves the corresponding expected search time.
This shows that the organizational structure sets a balance in the trade-off
between search and adaptation speed and optimality.
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Figure 2: Near decomposability.
It is easy to argue that in complex problem environments, characterized by
strong and diffused interdependencies, such a trade-off will tend to produce
structures that are more decomposed than what would be optimal given the
interdependencies of the problem space. This property is shown in Figures 3
and 4, that present the typical search paths on a non-decomposable problem
of two search processes driven, respectively, by decompositions:
D1 = {1, 2, . . . , 12}
D12 = {{1}, {2}, . . . , {12}}
Figure 3 shows the first 180 iterations in which the more decomposed struc-
ture (D12) quickly climbs the problem space and outperforms a search based
on a coarser decomposition. If there were a tight selection environment, a
more-than-optimally-decentralized structure would quickly displace structure
D1, that reflects the “true” decomposition of the underlying problem space.
7In this figure and the following we indicate on the vertical axis the rank of configurations
re-parametrized between 0 (worst) and 1 (best).
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However, the search process based on the finest decomposition quickly
reaches a local optimum from where no further improvement can occur, while
the process based on the coarser decomposition keeps searching and climbing
slowly. Figure 4 shows iterations between 3000 and 3800, where the finest
decomposition is still locked-into the local optimum it reached after very few
iterations, while the coarsest one slowly reaches the global optimum (normal-
ized to 1). Strong selective pressure therefore tends to favor structures whose
degree of decentralization is higher than what would be optimal from a mere
problem-solving perspective.
This result is even stronger in problems that we could define as “modular”,
those characterized by blocks with strong interdependencies within blocks and
much weaker (but non-zero) interdependencies between blocks; in these prob-
lems, higher levels of decompositions can be achieved at lower costs in terms
of sub-optimality.
All in all we have shown that if the innovation process in software is char-
acterized by high and diffused interdependencies, then it cannot be reduced
to a “perfectly Coasian” world. Even lacking transaction costs and with per-
fectly competitive markets finer property rights are not in general conducive
to higher technological efficiency. On the other hand competitive selection
environments tend to favor more than optimally decomposed structures, that
is more finely defined IPR’s, because of the higher adaptation speed of such
structures.
7.2 Proprietary vs. free problem-solving
Consider now a polyarchy (Sah & Stiglitz 1986), in which a collection of prob-
lem solving agents can work on the current solution and try to find an improve-
ment, if one agent finds an improvement then this becomes the new current
solution and the process begins again, until none of the agents can make any
further improvement on the current solution. We can compare three kinds
of institutional settings: one in which solutions are free and open-source and
once found by an agent become immediately available to everybody else for
cumulatively making further improvements. One in which on the contrary so-
lutions are proprietary and are not disclosed and any solution close enough to
one already protected is prohibited. Finally one in which existing solutions
can be licensed against the payment of a fee.
Consider first the free and open-source environment. To be more precise, we
suppose that agents are called sequentially and in a random order to perform
their search starting from a current solution. Each agent stop when a local
optimum (for its representation) is located and this local optimum becomes the
new current solution. Then another agent is called and the process is repeated
until no agent can make any further improvement. The outcome is the locally
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optimal solution for the polyarchic group8.
This process can be described as a path on the set of different agents’
local optima Λi. It is easy to understand that given enough diversity in such
sets, even if none of them is a singleton containing only the global optimum,
the polyarchy’s set of local optimum that we call ΛP can itself be such a
singleton. Such a diversity can be generated either by diversity of encodings
or by diversity of decompositions, but again diversity of encodings seems in a
sense more powerful. In fact, the following results are easy to prove:
1. if all agents share the same encoding Ω, but have different decomposi-
tions, then it is possible that ΛP be a singleton, i.e. that the group search
process locates with certainty the global optimum;
2. however, if the problem is not decomposable for the common encoding
Ω, a necessary condition is that at least one agent holds the degenerate
decomposition D = 1, 2, . . . , N ;
3. if all agents share the same finest decompositionD = {{1}, {2}, . . . , {N}}
but have diverse encodings, it is possible that ΛP be a singleton even
when none of the Λi is a singleton itself.
At the other extreme, if there is no variety among agents, i.e. if they
all share the same encoding and decomposition, then there is no difference
between group and individual performance, as ΛP = Λi for a generic agent.
Following (Hong & Page 2001) we can also define a notion of productivity
of agents: given a group and a new agent, does the addition of the latter
increase, and how much, the group performance? (Hong & Page 2001) show
that an agent’s productivity is extremely variable in the group’s composition
and has no significant correlation with the agent’s “ability”, as measured by
the expected value of its local optima.
8 Tentative conclusions
Back in the years in which what was good for FIAT was good for Italy, if
an economists’ committee would have proposed that the government should
support the efforts of volunteers to design and build their own cars for ex-
change, sale or free distribution, they would have probably been locked into a
psychiatric hospital (if Scelba or Tambroni did not get them first).
Yet, something pretty similar to this happened when the Italian govern-
ment (as well as the UE and the US) recommended in 2001 that Open Source
8A somehow similar model has been investigated by (Hong & Page 1998) and (Hong &
Page 2001).
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Software be supported and adopted in public offices as a strategic national
choice.
What is surprising, of course, is that something can be observed in a central
locus of contemporary economies that simply should not be there: production,
exchange and distribution outside the realm of both market interactions and
firm based hierarchies and out of the control of traditional property rights as
the main incentive mechanism.
In broader terms, what is really noteworthy is how in software, computer
communication and even in biotechnologies, firm strategies that do not depend
on strong IP and forms of division of labor that are not strictly based on
hierarchies have often outperformed “traditional” appropriation strategies and
divisions of labor. Examples are the adoption of such a standard as TCP/IP
rather than Compuserve, Prodigy or MSN or the strategy adopted by Merck
in pursuing complementary DNA sequencing (case discussed in (Heisenberg
1996)).
In our opinion the theme for discussion and analysis here is not the mere
fact that Open Source has emerged as an alternative mode of production and
distribution but rather the relationship between division of labor, technology
and protection regimes. Understanding causal relations between technology
and institutions is an old problem but, surprisingly enough, the question of
how IP regimes and the characteristic of information technology itself affect in-
formation production has remained relatively in the background of the current
debate.
To paint an old question with an extremely broad brush, the origins of
firm based hierarchies can be described along two basic dimensions. The firsts
runs as: what caused them to emerge? The second can be described by the
question: what is their essential nature?
In his famous 1974 paper, S. Marglin (Marglin 1974) – somehow rejecting a
straightforward marxian position – set forth the argument that the real engine
of exploitation is organization rather than technology. Task fragmentation was
the main tool used in order to deskill work and render it so simple and undif-
ferentiated that untrained proletariat could replace skilled artisans. According
to this perspective, the division of labor serves not an efficiency ideal but it
rather gives a capitalist the way to more efficiently control workers.
On the other hand Williamson and North, while subscribing the view that
hierarchy based firms did emerge for a matter of organization, focus on effi-
ciency considerations as to why they did emerge. In this sense, they largely
describe firms in terms of minimizing transaction costs, costs related to coor-
dinating finely subdivided processes and costs of monitoring product quality.
Given these considerations, we ask two questions. First, defining peer pro-
duction as a possible organization of a productive process, our question is: why
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did peer production (at least in some relevant cases) outperform market based
and hierarchy based production in (at least some) information production ac-
tivities? Given our considerations on the increased relevance of human capital
in information production, the relative lowering of physical capital importance
and the declining costs of communication, we conjecture that peer production
has a comparative advantage in acquiring and processing information about
human capital available to contribute to information production projects.
It is noteworthy that as far as 14th century (and till the beginning of 20th
century), the attitude towards patenting was to award domestic patents in or-
der to transfer technology produced and developed abroad for domestic usage.
So patenting was first and foremost serving its disclosure function rather than
its protecting one.
Originally, the IP system was designed with an eye to industrial applica-
tions as far as they were concerned with the physical transformations of raw
materials and not with digital goods. In particular, patenting requires certain
standards to be met (non obviousness, novelty, applicability). In this perspec-
tive, an algorithm cannot be patented since, as such and per se, it does not
have any direct industrial applicability.
Copyright, quite on the contrary, aims at protecting the expression of ideas
in some kind of medium. Under the Berne convention, no precise formal stan-
dards are to be met in order to copyright something. Copyright applies not
to raw ideas (which are considered to be part of nature and thus not created)
but solely to their expression.
According to this reading, no algorithm can be copyrighted as no algorithm
in itself (before software implementation) can be expressed with, say, artist-
specific flair and every algorithm is part of some underlying state of nature.
So, as paradoxical as it may seem, when an algorithm is copyrighted the
most relevant part of it, namely the underlying idea, is left unprotected. What
an IP owner does is acting on the implementation or on the expression’s flair
and it is on that dimension that producers try to distinguish themselves (e.g.
controls, menus...). Of course this kind of competition is wasteful, costly in
resources and it does nothing to improve both the availability and the quantity
of digital goods for society.
Also note incidentally that being the term of protection the author’s life
plus 70 years (or 95 years in total), by the time a piece of software falls in the
public domain there will be no machine that can possibly run it. So, the term
of copyright is actually unlimited.
Also note that when applied to software the system of copyright protect
software (ex-ante incentive) without creating any new knowledge in return nor
diffusing knowledge in society (ex-post efficiency). Consider, for instance, that
when the copyright system protects Melville at least society can appreciate
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and see how he wrote (his literary style, his way of building plots....) and
many people can improve their own writing style by reading Moby Dick and
receiving inspiration and plenty of usable example of better narrative style.
As to software, this ceases to be true: once a piece of code is compiled what
you get is something which is totally unreadable. Notwithstanding this fact,
in order to copyright a piece of code the author does not have to reveal the
source code.
In the long run, this way of protecting knowledge does nothing but destroy-
ing knowledge.
These ideas seem to be very much in line with (Boldrin & Levine 2002)
arguments. They maintain that “property” for e.g. land has nothing to do
with “property” in Intellectual Property and that the same notion does not
apply to ideas as it does to land. According to their perspective, the view
that equates the two meanings stems from confusing the abstract notion of
“idea” with the concrete implementation or embodiment of an idea (which, as
we have seen, is the key problem in copyrighting algorithms: i.e. the idea vs.
the flair/expression quibble).
According to Boldrin and Levine, IP law has come to mean not just the right
to sell and own ideas but the right to regulate their use. IP law has two basic
components: the first is the right to own and sell ideas (right of first sale) while
the second is the right to control their use after sale (downstream licensing).
The key point in their argument is that the traditional analysis leading to the
necessity of downstream licensing is critically based on assuming that costs
in innovative activity are fixed costs. On the contrary, these are sunk costs
(i.e. costs related to producing the first unit). Sunk costs do not pose any
particular problem nor serious threat to competition. As a matter of facts no
one claims that a monopoly right should be legally accorded to producers of
any good whose production involves sunk costs.
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